This paper provides evidence that consumer use of Internet referral services lowers purchase prices in an important, established, offline industry, the retail auto industry. Using a large dataset of transaction prices for new automobiles and referral data from Autobytel.com, we find that online consumers pay on average 1% less than do offline consumers. After controlling for non-random selection of Autobytel.com usage, we find that use of the site reduces the price a consumer pays by approximately 2.2%. This result suggests that, counter to many people's initial intuition, consumers who use an Internet referral service are not those who are savvy at the bargaining process, and therefore use the Internet as additional way to improve their bargaining position. Instead, our finding is consistent with consumers choosing to use Autobytel.com because they know that they would do poorly in the traditional channel, perhaps because they have a high personal cost to collecting information and bargaining. This group disproportionately uses Autobytel.com because its members are the ones with the most to gain. We estimate that savings to this initial group of early adopters who use Autobytel.com are at least $240 million per year. Since there are other referral and informational sites that may also help consumers bargain more effectively with dealers, we conclude that -at least at the time of our study -the Internet is facilitating a substantial redistribution of surplus in the retail auto industry.
From the time the Internet started to be used for commercial applications, much attention has centered on predictions that, while the Internet would introduce new business opportunities for some firms, it would substantially lower the profitability of many firms. These predictions were based on economic and marketing theories which show that the more easily customers can obtain information about prices and products, the lower seller's profitability will be, either through market forces of competition or because customers will have better negotiating positions. Consequently there has been a lot of interest both academically and in the business community in how online markets, in which information is believed to be more easily obtainable, would differ from offline markets.
An area that has received much less attention is how the Internet affects offline transactions in established industries. Transactions need not occur online in order to be affected by the fact that the Internet makes price and product information more easily available, and that new Internet institutions change the way that price negotiation is conducted.
An excellent illustration of this is the auto industry, one of the largest and most important industries in the US. By regulation, retail sales of new automobiles must be made by local dealers, not by manufacturers or third parties. Most automobile dealers sell cars by negotiating prices individually with each customer. As a result, identical cars can sell for prices that differ by hundreds, or even thousands, of dollars. Dealership profits would therefore be dramatically reduced if all customers paid the lowest price a dealer is willing to agree to. The Internet has made possible easily accessible third party "infomediaries," which purport to enable customers to obtain just such prices. Not surprisingly, given the magnitude of consumers' average expenditure and the confrontational nature of the purchase process, infomediaries have become popular in the automotive industry. In 2000, according to J.D. Power and Associates (2000b) , 48% of new car buyers visited at least one independent vehicle site such as Autobytel.com, Carpoint.com, Edmunds.com, ConsumerReports.com, and KelleyBlueBook.com. The question this paper addresses is whether such infomediaries can lower prices -and perhaps profits -in an established offline industry. In particular, we examine evidence that Internet referral services causally lower prices for retail auto sales. This paper begins where Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) left off. In that paper we showed that consumers in California who used such a service paid on average 1.5% less, controlling for the car purchased, than traditional consumers. However, that finding appears at first blush to say more about whether the Internet lowers car retailers' profitability than it really does. This is because, holding cost constant, profits in the car industry will have been changed by the Internet only if the Internet has changed the distribution of prices. Just because Internet consumers are 2 paying less than offline consumers does not mean that they are paying less than they would if the Internet did not exist. Disproportionate movement of good bargainers to the Internet, the "cowboys" of our title, would generate unequal prices in the two channels, and lower prices in the Internet channel, without changing the price any given individual pays. Instead, if Internet referral services are used disproportionally by those who are averse to comparison shopping and haggling, the "cowards" of our title, then the Internet is aiding these consumers in obtaining lower prices than they would receive offline. In this latter case, the Internet has a real effect on the distribution of prices, and hence the division of surplus in car retailing.
To obtain an estimate of the causal effect of Internet referral services on car prices, we control for potential selection effects with instrumental variables. In addition to estimating the 'treatment' effect of Internet referral services on the prices paid by online consumers, this approach also allow us determine which types of consumers are disproportionally likely to use the Internet for car buying. We supplement this statistical approach with a consumer survey in which we ask consumers directly about the unobserved variables which we believe may lead to selection effects. This allows us to test directly for a correlation between these variables and reported Internet use.
We answer these research question by analyzing transaction data on over 600,000 new car purchases nationwide in combination with referral data from Autobytel.com. Autobytel.com is an independent Internet referral service that offers consumers detailed information about individual cars, including current market conditions and invoice pricing. Autobytel.com also has contractual relationships with approximately 5,000 of the 22,000 US dealerships (in Q1, 2001) which are designed to help Autobytel.com users get good prices for their cars. From the website, a consumer may submit a free purchase request that is forwarded to one of Autobytel.com's contracting dealers. The dealer then responds with a price offer which is supposed to be the lowest price the dealer would generally offer in the showroom.
We find that consumers who use Autobytel.com pay on average 1% less than do traditional buyers for an identical car. However, after instrumenting for Autobytel.com usage, our estimate of the causal effect of the Internet on price, compared to the traditional channel is approximately 2.2%. (Purchasing from an Autobytel.com affiliated dealer, regardless of what channel was used to buy the car, results in price that is lower by about 0.7%.) The increase in the magnitude of the Autobytel.com coefficient between the two specifications suggests that consumers who use an Internet referral service are those who are poor at bargaining in the traditional channel. This may be due to a lack of bargaining skill, or an aversion to (or high cost of) engaging in protracted face-to-face negotiation. Whatever the reason, these consumers seem to be sufficiently aware of their bargaining disadvantage that they choose to use the Internet as a way to improve their bargaining outcome.
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While these results suggests that consumers who consider themselves disadvantaged in the traditional face-to-face bargaining process are more likely to use the Internet, we cannot test this conclusion directly with our large dataset of transactions because the data lacks measures of consumers' cost of bargaining or searching. Therefore we have collected a second set of data which contains measures of whether individuals perceive themselves to be poor bargainers and whether they are time constrained in negotiating for a new car. We find that consumers who expressed a high disutility of bargaining and lack of time were more likely to use the Internet.
These results confirm our conjecture from our instrumental variables estimation, namely that it is the "cowards," not the "cowboys" who are disproportionately likely to use the Internet.
We conclude from the combination of our results that the Internet, by aiding some consumers in obtaining lower prices than they would have received offline, has had -at the time of our study -a real effect on the division of surplus in car retailing. We hesitate to draw conclusions about the long run equilibrium in this industry, since our data are for 1999, a relatively early year for Internet referral services. Our analysis focuses on the early adopters of this technology, and assumes that this small group has not yet caused changes in the remainder of the industry -such as new offline equilibrium prices and dealer exits.
We also find that consumers who purchase at the Autobytel.com dealer to whom they were referred pay, on average, nearly the same as consumers who switch to another dealer ($32 less for switchers). While this suggests that the information provided by Autobytel.com is portable, it also suggests that consumers, on average, benefit only a very small amount from switching away from the referral dealer. Further, we compare the prices paid by online consumers who obtained a referral for the specific make and model that they purchased with the prices paid by online consumers who requested a referral for a car different from the one they ultimately bought.
The group that obtained information on the product purchased paid about 1% less than offline consumers; the group that obtained information on a different product from the one purchased paid 0.5% less than offline consumers. This suggests that having a make-and model-specific price quote has a bigger effect on the price a customer pays than does general information that might be obtained using the Internet. It also suggests that information drives prices, not individual characteristics associated with Internet usage. This finding is also consistent with our previous result, namely that the mere fact that a consumer has chosen to use the Internet in searching for a new car cannot explain the lower prices Autobytel.com consumers obtain. This paper contributes to a small body of empirical literature analyzing the effect of Internet institutions such as referral services and shopping agents on firms' product market behavior. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) , Ellison and Ellison (2001) , and Iyer and Pazgal (2003) analyze the effect of comparison shopping agents on firms' pricing strategies. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) shows that the Internet may have helped to lower prices for term life insurance. In a 4 recent theoretical paper, Chen, Iyer, and Padmanabhan (2002) analyze "referral infomediaries" and argue that referral services help retailers price discriminate and that referral infomediaries should contract only with a subset of retailers. Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) is the precursor to this paper -we begin where that paper ends. That paper documents differences in online vs. offline pricing of new cars, however, it does not address selection, rent redistribution, or the effects of competition. In particular, Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) does not estimate the 'treatment effect' of referral infomediaries nor does it answer which types of consumers are most likely to use the Internet. Finally, that paper only had data from California, whereas the present paper relies on a national sample.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we discuss why an Internet referral service may change vehicle prices. In section 3, we discuss our national transaction dataset. Section 4 is a comparison of online and offline prices for cars. We also examine how the price paid by Autobytel.com users varies with level of competition in the retail auto market. In section 5, we control for selection and derive the average savings that result from using Autobytel.com. We also estimate consumers' probability of using the Internet with a second set of data which includes measures of consumer traits. Section 6 is an analysis of which aspect of a referral enables consumers to obtain a lower price. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The effect of Internet referral services on prices
A consumer who submits a purchase request on an Internet referral service provides her name, address, contact information, and the type of car she is looking for. The dealership contacts the consumer within 48 hours (often much sooner) with a "fixed" price. 1 In this way, a consumer may purchase a car without setting foot in the dealership until she picks up the vehicle.
Autobytel.com assigns dealers an exclusive territory; any leads generated within that territory are passed on to the dealer in exchange for a dealer subscription fee. Dealers pay an annual fixed fee based on the size of the dealership, on average $1607/month. Since the closing ratio (sales/referrals) is about 13% for Autobytel.com, dealers pay on average $135 per sold vehicle to Autobytel.com. 2 . In this section, we discuss several reasons for which Internet referral service users might pay prices different from those paid by traditional consumers.
1 According to J.D. Power and Associates (2000a) , 42% of dealerships claim that their initial price contains no room for further negotiation. 42% give discounts but leave room for negotiation. 14% will quote a discounted price only if the customer insists by e-mail or phone. 2% of dealerships don't give discounted price until the consumer comes to the dealership.
2 Youngme Moon (1999), "Autobytel.com," HBS Case Study, and J.D. Power and Associates (2000a) 5 2.1 Possible reasons for offline vs. online price differences
There are several different, not necessarily mutually exclusive, reasons that online prices may be lower than offline prices.
Online consumers are better informed: The higher quality and lower price of online information may lead consumers to consume more information than they would have offline. Consumers who are better informed about market prices, the characteristics of their preferred cars, and negotiation strategies may be better armed to bargain with the dealer and thus receive, on average, a lower price. Better information is likely to be particularly important because prices for cars are individually negotiated, instead of being posted.
Bargaining on behalf of consumers: The contract between the Internet referral service and the dealer contains incentives that may cause the dealer to offer referred customers low prices.
While an Autobytel.com dealer may decide whether and how to convert each lead into a sale, the service expects a substantial proportion of leads to result in a sale. Salesperson compensation: Autobytel.com stipulates in its contracts that the "Internet sales-
person" at a dealership should handle only Internet referrals and not "walk-ins." Also, this salesperson is supposed to be compensated on sales volume rather than on margin. This encourages the Internet salesperson to focus on closing additional sales rather than on maximizing unit profits. 5 However, both dealers and managers at Autobytel.com reported inconsistent compliance among dealers with Autobytel.com's rules.
Lower selling cost: It is possible that an Internet sale is less costly to carry out than a conventional sale. Online buyers may be low cost because they have searched already (perhaps 3 Autobytel.com monitors this with customer satisfaction surveys. These surveys are the only way the referral service knows if its customers are receiving the service they expected.
4 Autobytel.com dealers have told us that they consider the subscription fee to be a kind of dealer advertising; the cost of attracting one customer using Autobytel.com is less than that of using traditional advertising.
5 We would expect this practice itself -regardless of the Internet -to lead to lower prices. However, it would presumably be much more effective for a given dealership to implement it in conjunction with an increase in consumer traffic. In this way, the salesperson's total compensation and hours worked remain high. The low price/high volume strategy can be more effectively undertaken through business stealing via the Internet in conjunction with a change in sales staff compensation. 6 test-driving at another dealership), have decided what car they want, and are ready to buy. Therefore, the dealer may be able to spend less time selling and haggling. Because Internet sales typically are performed by an "Internet Sales Department" with profit and loss responsibility separate from conventional sales, we would expect that lower costs in that department might translate into lower equilibrium prices for cars sold to Internet customers.
Lower cost dealerships: In addition, consumers may gain from shopping online even if Internet referral services do not cause dealers to offer different prices to online and offline consumers. This is because referral services may simply sign up the lowest-cost/lowest-price dealers in each region. In this way a consumer gains by using the service because she does not have to search for the cheapest dealership in her area.
There is also an argument for why consumers who use referral services may pay more than other consumers.
Online consumers are less price sensitive: Internet referral services are convenient because they allow a consumer to engage in the car purchase process at any time of day or night without leaving her home. In addition, referral services reduce consumers' direct interaction with dealers. To the extent that consumers with a high utility for convenience are less price sensitive, we should expect that dealers charge referral customers higher prices-not lower prices as claimed by Internet referral services.
Selection
Even if we observe that average online prices are lower than average offline prices, it could still be the case that a referral site has no effect on the price a particular consumer receives. Suppose that Autobytel.com consumers would have obtained information from books and friends in the absence of the Internet, or that these are customers who are already good bargainers ("cowboys"). Then Autobytel.com might simply substitute for other information sources and mechanisms which existed before the advent of the Internet; consumers could be paying the same prices they would have without the Internet, but because these consumers disproportionately use the Internet, Internet prices are lower than average. Note, however, that the selection effect could also work in the opposite direction from that just described. Suppose that Autobytel.com users have a high personal cost to collecting information and bargaining. Such consumers know that they will pay a relatively high offline price for a car because they find it costly to, for example, comparison shop and haggle ("cowards").
If so, they will benefit more than will an average buyer from a service that provides information and "bargains" on their behalf. This may cause them to be more likely to use Autobytel.com.
Notice that if the consumers who use Autobytel.com are not a random sample of the population, we can infer whether it is the 'cowboys' or 'cowards' who choose to use the Internet from whether the estimated coefficient on Internet usage rises or falls when moving from a specification that does not control for selection (OLS) to a specification that does (IV). This inference also indicates whether the Internet has a real effect on the division of surplus in car retailing.
For example, a drop in the estimated Autobytel.com coefficient when moving from OLS to IV implies both that the causal effect of the Internet is negative, and that consumers who use Internet referral services would have paid above average prices had they not used the Internet.
We can conclude that the Internet has redistributed surplus from dealers to customers. If controlling for selection increases the estimate of the average price paid by a referred consumer to zero, then consumers who use Internet referral services are simply "savvy bargainers" and Autobytel.com has no causal effect on the distribution of surplus in car retailing.
Data
Our data come from from a major supplier of marketing research information (henceforth MRI) and Autobytel.com. MRI collects transaction data from a sample of dealers in the major metropolitan areas in the US. We have data containing every new car transaction at these dealerships from January 1, 1999 to February 28, 2000. 6 These data include customer information, the make, model and trim level of the car, financing information, trade-in information, dealer-added extras, and the profitability of the car and the customer to the dealership.
We add to these data information on whether a consumer submitted a purchase request using Autobytel.com during 1999. We consider a match between observations from Autobytel.com and MRI when either the geocoded address or the phone number associated with the referral and the purchase transaction are the same. Each observation in the new dataset is a transaction from the MRI data, augmented by the information from the Autobytel.com data if there was a match. 7 We define four variables that measure Internet usage and subsequent purchase decisions. The first variable is an indicator variable for an Autobytel.com customer (Autobytel ), which marks whether the customer who purchased the car submitted a purchase request using Autobytel.com. The unit of observation is a transaction, not a referral, and this variable is equal to 1 for any customer who requested a referral, whether or not the transaction 6 We include an additional two months of transaction data to capture consumers who asked for a referral in 1999 but did not finalize the transaction until 2000. While most referrals result in transactions within a few days, some take longer. For example, some consumers ask for referrals for multiple cars over time before buying a vehicle.
7 We cannot analyze the purchase choices of non-matching Autobytel.com customers as we do not know whether they purchased a car and if they have, what car they purchased. 8 was at the dealership to which the customer was referred. The second variable we create is an indicator variable for an Autobytel.com franchise dealer (AutobytelFranchise), which indicates whether the dealer that sold the car is an Autobytel.com affiliated dealer. Affiliation means that the dealer is under contract with Autobytel.com and receives purchase requests. The third indicator is SameDealer and marks cases in which the dealer that sold the car is the same dealer to which the purchase request was submitted. Note that SameDealer can equal 1 only if Autobytel=1. The final indicator variable, ChangeCar, marks whether the make and model an Autobytel.com user bought differs from the make and model for which she obtained a referral. Autobytel.com was the leading Internet referral service in 1999 with slightly over 2 million referrals. 8 However, since there are online referral services other than Autobytel.com, the customers in the combined dataset who are not identified as using Autobytel.com may have used one of its competitors. This biases our empirical result against finding lower prices for Internet users since we will be comparing a group that used Autobytel.com with a group that may include users of competing services.
Within the group that used Autobytel.com, about half of consumers buy a make and model for which they did not request a purchase referral. For most of the results that follow, we restrict ourselves to observations in which an Autobytel.com user purchased a make and model for which she requested a referral. 9 Restricting ourselves to these consumers who are informed about the car they buy, makes for the cleanest comparison between more informed Autobytel.com users and less informed non-users. Thus, the main dataset, results, and summary statistics exclude the consumers who buy a make and model different from the one they requested. Later in the paper we return to considering the remaining Autobytel.com consumers. After dropping observations with missing data, our main dataset has 620,641 transactions at 3514 dealerships.
Summary statistics are in the Appendix.
Dependent variable
The price observed in the dataset is the price that the customer pays for the vehicle including factory installed accessories and options and the dealer-installed accessories contracted for at the time of sale that contribute to the resale value of the car. 10 The Price variable we use as the dependent variable is this price, minus the ManufacturerRebate, if any, given directly to the consumer, and minus what is known as the TradeInOverAllowance. TradeInOverAllowance is the difference between the trade-in price paid by the dealer to the consumer and the estimated wholesale value of the trade-in vehicle (as booked by the dealer). We adjust for this amount to account for the possibility, for example, that dealers may offer consumers a low price for the new car because they are profiting from the trade-in.
Controls
We control for car fixed effects. A "car" in our sample is the interaction of make, model, body type, transmission, displacement, doors, cylinders, and trim level. This leaves 834 thus-defined cars after dropping cars with fewer than 300 sales. We exclude these data because the smaller number of observations limits what we learn from these cars and because we want to be able to estimate car fixed effects. While our car fixed effects will control for many of the factors that contribute to the price of a car, it will not control for the factory-and dealer-installed options which vary within trim level. The price we observe covers such options but we do not observe what options the car actually has. In order to control for price differences caused by options, we include as an explanatory variable the percent deviation of the dealer's cost of purchasing the vehicle from the average vehicle cost of that car in the dataset. This percent deviation, called VehicleCost will be positive when the car has an unobserved option (for example a CD player) and is therefore relatively expensive compared to other examples of the same car as specified above. The measure also takes into account any variation in holdback and transportation charges.
To control for time variation in prices, we define a dummy EndOfMonth that equals 1 if the car was sold within the last 5 days of the month. A dummy variable WeekEnd specifies whether the car was purchased on a Saturday or Sunday to control for a similar, weekly effect.
In addition, we introduce dummies for each month in the 14 month sample period to control for other seasonal effects and for inflation. If there are volume targets or sales on weekends, near the end of the month, or seasonally, we will pick them up with these variables.
We control for the number of months between a car's introduction and when it was sold. This proxies for how new a car design is and also for the dealer's opportunity cost of not selling the car. Judging by the distribution of sales after car introductions, we distinguish between sales in the first four months, months 5-13, and month 14 and later and assign a dummy variable to each category.
We control for the competitiveness of each dealer's market. For each dealership we count the number of dealerships with the same nameplate that fall in a zip code that is within a 10 mile radius of the zip code of the focal dealership. We control for cases where one owner owns several franchises, by counting only the number of separately-controlled entities.
We also control for the income, education, occupation, and race of buyers by using census data that MRI matches with the buyer's address from the transaction record. The data is on the level of a "block group," which makes up about one fourth of the area and population of a census tract. On average, block groups have about 1100 people in them. Finally, we control the region in which the car was sold.
Summary statistics
We present descriptive statistics by whether a consumer used Autobytel.com to get a price quote for the make and model car they purchased. Table 1 on page 29 shows that 3.1% of the buyers in the sample used Autobytel.com, while 24% of the cars in the sample are sold at dealerships that have a contract with Autobytel.com. 11 Of consumers in the sample, 40% trade in a vehicle, and 75% obtain some amount of dealer financing. About 36% of customers are female, and the average age of all buyers in the sample is 44. Among consumers who used Autobytel.com, 28% buy from the dealer they were referred to (see Table 2 ). The average price of the cars bought by Autobytel.com consumers is higher and their TradeInOverAllowance, the amount the dealer subsidizes the trade-in, is considerably lower. The gross profit margin does not differ greatly between online and offline sales. The average offline car earns a dealer $1438 compared to $1382 for a sale through Autobytel.com.
Autobytel.com affiliated dealers are clearly different from others (see Table 3 ). They are larger, fewer of their sales involve a trade-in vehicle, and they are located in areas that are slightly more competitive. Autobytel.com franchises have customers who are from higher income neighborhoods, but on average, they serve people from minority census tracts as often as do other dealerships. The average age of customers at the two types of dealerships is similar.
Price Estimation
Our primary interest is whether use of Autobytel.com alters the average price a consumer pays for her car. In this section we use a standard hedonic regression to estimate whether Autobytel.com users pay different prices than other consumers. In the next section we control for selection and contrast the OLS and IV results. We follow the hedonic pricing literature (for example Fisher, Grilliches, and Kaysen (1962) ) and work with ln(P rice) as our dependent variable. 12 We estimate the following specification:
The X matrix is composed of transaction and car variables: car, month, and region fixed effects, controls for model recency, whether the consumer traded in a vehicle, and car cost.
Full sample results
Prices paid by Autobytel.com users are 1% lower than those paid by other customers (see column 1 in Table 4 ). This estimate is smaller than the 1.5% we found in an earlier paper in which we had data only from California (Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2001).
Purchasing from an Autobytel.com affiliated dealer, regardless of what channel was used to buy the car, is associated with a price that is lower by about 0.5%, unchanged from our earlier estimates.
The second column of Table 4 adds demographics. Because an individual buyer is assigned the demographic characteristics of her census block group, the explanatory variables are either a probability that a characteristic applies to the customer (such as %CollegeGraduates) or an average/median (such as MedianHHIncome). The two exceptions to this are Age, which is the actual age of the customer, Over64, which is a dummy indicating if the person's age is above 64, and Female, which is inferred by MRI based on an analysis of the buyer's first name.
The Autobytel.com results in column two are very similar to those in column one. The Autobytel.com coefficient falls slightly in magnitude to -.88%. Again, buyers who purchase at an Autobytel.com franchise pay lower prices. The demographic coefficients have the expected signs. In particular, older people pay more for cars (0.2% increase if age moves from 20 to 64) until a consumer hits retirement age, whereupon a negative indicator variable of -0.16% takes effect. People who have a higher probability of being a disadvantaged minority (black and Hispanic) pay more. An increase from zero to one hundred percent black (Hispanic) in a census tract raises the expected price of the car by 1.4% (1.1%). For more details on the effect of race on car prices, see Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003a). Women pay about 0.2% more than do men for a given car. We expect income and education to be correlated, and we also expect them to have opposite effects on car prices. High income indicates a lower elasticity of demand, while high educational levels may make a person a more effective bargainer. Hence, we have few priors on the signs of these neighborhood variables. They are mostly significant: more income and high house values are associated with lower car prices, while consumers in a more "professional" neighborhood pay higher prices. Home ownership, a proxy for good credit, is associated with lower prices. Buyers from neighborhoods with a higher proportion of %CollegeGraduates pay lower prices, as we expected, while an increase of ten percent in the probability of not finishing high school in a census tract is associated with an increase in a resident's price by 0.04% on average.
Results by vehicle segment
We find that there is considerable variation in the Autobytel.com discount by vehicle subsegment (see Table 5 ). MRI separates the cars in the dataset into sixteen subsegments such as 
Competitive Effects
Prices are higher when dealers are in areas with fewer other dealers of the same nameplate (see column 1 in Table 6 ). Moving from zero to ten other dealers of the same nameplate within ten miles lowers the average price by approximately 0.3% ($69 on the average car). This effect may be small because our data do not include sales in rural areas, so we do not have as much variation in market structure as do some other studies.
We are also curious as to whether Autobytel.com creates an effect similar to adding another competitor to the marketplace. For example, in a concentrated local market, the availability of getting a price quote over the web might be equivalent to increasing competition in the local market. If so, we would expect the price discount obtained by using Autobytel.com to be higher in less competitive markets. As the market becomes more competitive, the addition of another competitor should have less effect on equilibrium prices (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991) .
The institutional role of Autobytel.com suggests that Autobytel.com could also have the opposite effect. Bargaining over price may effectively occur between the dealer and Autobytel.com, in addition to between the customer and the dealer. In such a case, more dealers in an area will strengthen the hand of Autobytel.com because it can credibly threaten to move its franchise to another dealer more easily. A greater density of dealers may allow Autobytel.com to more easily pressure dealers into offering lower prices to consumers. We find that the interaction between Autobytel.com and the number of dealers of the same nameplate in the area is negative (see column 2 in Table 6 ). It appears that Autobytel.com has more influence on dealer pricing in more competitive markets, and that this effect is larger in magnitude than that of the simple competition measure.
Discussion
The results show that dealerships that contract with an Internet referral service set lower offline prices than do other dealerships, and that consumers who submit a purchase request pay a lower price than do other consumers at that dealership. Any potential convenience and income effect is dominated by price-reducing effects. Online consumers who buy through Autobytel.com pay on average 1% less than do offline consumers, for the same car. On average, consumers who shop at an Autobytel.com contract dealer gain slightly relative to shopping at a non-Autobytel.com contract dealer. The payoff from using Autobytel.com increases as the local market becomes more competitive.
To test for whether the volume-based compensation that Autobytel.com encourages for Internet salespeople may be contributing to lower prices, we limit the sample to cars purchased on the last two days of the month. The volume incentives facing dealers on those days are similar to the volume incentives Autobytel.com suggests dealers use for salespeople handling its leads. Thus the two groups should be more similar at this time of the month if part of what is driving the Autobytel.com "discount" is salesperson behavior. We find only a small drop in the Autobytel.com coefficient to about -.78% in this specification (see column 3 in Table 4 ).
Since much of the previously estimated Autobytel.com discount remains when estimated on a sample of cars which are all sold under volume-based incentives, this suggests that volume-based compensation plays only a small role in the lower prices paid by Autobytel.com consumers.
14 Thus far we have not attempted to discriminate between two different interpretations of the finding that Autobytel.com customers pay less: (1) the referral service attracts consumers who subsequently pay lower prices than they would have if Autobytel.com had not been available, or (2) the referral service attracts consumers who would have paid the same prices in the absence of the Internet because they would have used other means to obtain a low price. Formally, consider the following set of equations where C is an individual specific characteristic that is unobserved and forms part of the error term.
Suppose C is the ability to gather information and use it in the bargaining process. This characteristic ("cowboy") causes the buyer to use Autobytel.com to strengthen her bargaining position, leading to positive α and a negative δ. Since C is unobserved, Autobytel will be correlated with equation 2's error term. In this scenario the estimated coefficient on Autobytel will be negatively biased relative to the true coefficient.
The selection effect could also work in the opposite direction. Suppose that characteristic C indicated that the buyer has high personal cost to collecting information and bargaining ("coward"). Then α would be positive, but δ would be positive also. Hence, the estimated Autobytel.com coefficient will be biased upward and the true savings from using the service will be larger than the OLS estimates.
Instrumental Variables Estimation
In order to estimate the true effect of Autobytel.com usage on price, we use an instrumental variables procedure. The unobserved characteristic that could potentially determine both Autobytel.com usage and negotiated prices is an individual's ability or desire to price negotiate, for example by gathering information and using it in the bargaining process. Our instruments must therefore predict usage of Autobytel.com but be uncorrelated with this characteristic. In other research settings demographic information can be used to predict Internet usage. In the case of negotiated prices, however, almost all demographic indicators (for example, income or education) are likely also to be correlated with price, making it particularly difficult to find good instruments.
Instruments for Autobytel : For our instrument we use information on the total number of Autobytel.com referrals in the customer's zip code in 1999. Autobytel.com made approximately 2,000,000 referrals in 1999. This number includes the Autobytel.com consumers who are in our sample of transactions, but consists mostly of referrals that resulted in a purchase at a dealer outside our sample and referrals that never resulted in a purchase. For each observation in our transaction-based dataset we use the number of referrals out of the two million total referrals requested by residents living in the same zip code as the individual represented in that observation, excluding referrals requested by that individual. We also use this number divided by the population in the zip code. These measures capture variation in the diffusion of Autobytel.com use across neighborhoods, perhaps driven by word of mouth. We use both the total number of referrals and the number of referrals per person because we do not have strong a priori beliefs about the nature of the diffusion process.
These zip code-level measures are correlated with the propensity of an individual consumer in our sample to use Autobytel.com, but because these measures contain no information about the individual's own actions they cannot be correlated with unobserved characteristics that are purely idiosyncratic to that individual. In particular, the measures cannot be correlated with a difference between that individual and other consumers in the same zip code in ability and willingness to price negotiate. Thus there is no endogeneity between zip code level Autobytel.com use and the ability and willingness to price negotiate idiosyncratic to an individual living in that zip code. However, zip code Autobytel.com use may be correlated with the ability and willingness to price negotiate common to individuals in the zip code. This would be a problem if we did not have detailed demographic controls at the level of the neighborhood (because we would simply be substituting group-level endogeneity for individual-level endogeneity). However, because we have information on many demographic variables at the level of a census block group we expect to be able to control directly for any information-seeking or bargaining abilities common to consumers in the zip code. (Census blocks groups are much smaller than zip codes). Hence, our instruments are valid under the maintained assumption that there are no unobserved zip code level effects that are correlated with price once we have controlled for our census block group variables.
Instruments for AutobytelFranchise: We also require an instrument for AutobytelFranchise. This is because consumers who have requested an Autobytel.com referral are more likely to end up purchasing from an Autobytel.com contract dealer than is the average offline consumer. Since Autobytel.com franchise usage is correlated with Autobytel.com usage, and
Autobytel is correlated with the error term in the price equation, so is AutobytelFranchise. We would like an instrument that is correlated with the propensity of an individual to purchase a car at an Autobytel.com contract dealer but is uncorrelated with the individual's ability or desire to bargain. For our instrument, we calculate how much closer the consumer lives to the closest dealer of the make he or she purchased than to the nearest Autobytel.com affiliated dealer of the same make. This variable is correlated with whether a consumer purchases at an Autobytel.com contract dealer because it measures the additional distance a consumer needs to travel to get to the closest Autobytel.com dealer of the relevant make. We also include an indicator variable if the Autobytel.com contract dealer is the closest dealer. We believe that these measures are uncorrelated with price because it seems unlikely that consumers' ability or desire to bargain determines their relative distance to an Autobytel.com franchise.
Estimation and results:
We run a two stage least squares squares regression of ln(P rice),
with the Autobytel and AutobytelFranchise indicators as the endogenous variables. To accommodate the discrete nature of our endogenous variables we follow Angrist (2001) by using as the instruments in the 2SLS estimation the predicted values from probit specifications of Autobytel and AutobytelFranchise on the previously discussed instruments and the exogenous variables from the price equation. 13 The pseudo R 2 in the Autobytel probit is .06. This measure likely underrepresents the ability of our instruments to predict total Internet referral usage because we do not know which consumers used Autobytel.com's two largest competitors (Carpoint and Autoweb). The pseudo R 2 of .12 in the AutobytelFranchise probit is somewhat higher since distance is a good predictor of dealer choice. We report the results of the first stage regression in Table ? ?.
In this 2SLS specification the coefficient on Autobytel.com is -2.28%, more than twice the magnitude of the OLS estimate (see column 4 in Table 4 ). The coefficient on AutobytelFranchise increases in magnitude slightly to -.7%. Both estimates are significantly different from zero at conventional levels.
Additional instruments and specifications:
We also exploit the time variation in Autobytel.com referrals by calculating the number of referrals per month and zip code. We match each purchase to the measure in the appropriate zip code in the month prior to the purchase.
We run a specification identical to that in column 4 of Table 4 with the monthly instead of the total number of referrals (see column 5). The Autobytel coefficient decreases slightly to -2.13%
while the AutobytelFranchise coefficient remains at -.7%.
We also obtained a measure of Autobytel's national television advertising spending as a further instrument for Autobytel. 14 This instrument varies by week but not by location. We are interested in using Autobytel.com advertising because it is exogenous to purchase price and should predict Autobytel.com usage over time. Ideally we would like to match the date of advertising spending to the date of a given referral. However, since we do not observe a consumer's decision not to obtain a referral, such matching is not possible, and so we must rely on the purchase date of a vehicle instead. The measure that best predicts referrals is the sum of advertising spending two and three weeks before the vehicle purchase, and this is what we use as an instrument. 15 Regrettably, even this measure is not very predictive of referrals.
The advertising variable has a t-value of 1.5 in the estimation of the probit specification (not reported). This could be because there is large heterogeneity in the length of time between a referral and the car purchase; 25% of consumers buy a car within 7 days of their referral, half within 22 days, and 75% within 72 days. Since we have to match the week of advertising spending to the purchase date and not the referral date, any given lag with which we construct the advertising instrument will predict referrals poorly for some consumers.
We report a specification identical to that in column 4 of Table 4 with our advertising instrument added (see column 6). The IV estimates of the Autobytel and AutobytelFranchise coefficients are nearly identical at -2.25% and -.7%, respectively. This is our preferred specification due to the presence of an additional instrument, advertising. Note that in this and all previous specifications the instruments pass a test of overidentifying restrictions described in Hausman (1983) . The test statistic is N * R 2 from a regression of the IV errors on all the exogenous variables in the system. It is distributed χ 2 with K-1 degrees of freedom, where K is the number of instruments.
Discussion
Across instrumental variables specifications, a consumer buying through Autobytel.com is estimated to save approximately 2.2%, corresponding to about $500 on the average car. This is larger in magnitude than the OLS point estimate. We can thus conclude that the negative sign of the OLS coefficient is not an artifact of selection. In other words, it appears that the lower prices associated with Autobytel.com usage are caused by Internet use. This implies a change in the overall distribution of prices. Below we plot the distributions of prices in the two channels to see how they are affected. Table 4 excluding Autobytel.com related explanatory variables). Residuals from Autobytel.com sales are plotted below those of non-Autobytel.com sales. The distribution of residuals for Autobytel.com sales is of lower mean and variance than those of "street" sales.
Notice also that the Autobytel.com distribution has a much thinner upper tail than the nonAutobytel.com distribution. The lower tails of the two distributions are very similar. This is what we would expect to see if consumers who would have paid an above average price pay a price closer to the mean after using the Internet.
Notice also that the difference between the OLS and the IV estimates indicates that consumers who use Autobytel.com would have paid above average prices offline. Taking the coefficients at face value, the OLS estimates indicate that consumers who use Autobytel.com pay approximately 0.9% below the average for the rest of the sample for a given car. The IV estimates, which correct for selection and, under the identifying assumption, consistently estimate the true treatment effect, estimate the effect of Autobytel.com usage on price at approximately 2.2%. In order to reconcile a treatment effect of 2.2% with an average effect of 0.9%, it must be that Autobytel.com consumers should have paid 1.3% above the average in the rest of the sample, had they not used Autobytel.com. While this difference suggests that it is the "cowards"
who are disproportionately likely to use Autobytel.com, the statistical precision of our results does not allow us to conclude this definitively. In particular, the OLS estimate of Autobytel would be excluded only by the 88% (not the 95%) confidence interval of the IV estimate (see columns 2 and 4 in Table 4 ). Since we would like more evidence on this critical point, we now turn to direct measures of customer types and Internet usage.
Evidence from survey data
We want to determine whether consumers who consider themselves disadvantaged in the traditional face-to-face bargaining process are more likely to use the Internet. Since our large dataset of transactions lacks information which would allow us to directly measure a consumer's cost of bargaining or collecting information, we have gathered a second set of data which contains such measures. These data also contain information on whether consumers used the Internet to shop for a car. We can therefore relate consumer types to their likelihood of using the Internet. Each potential respondent received three mailings. The first mailing contained a letter announcing the arrival of the survey, introducing ourselves as the researchers and explaining the purpose of the project. The second mailing was sent out 5 days later and contained a cover letter, the survey, a pre-stamped return envelope, and a $1 bill. The third mailing was sent out 5 days after the second mailing and consisted of a postcard thanking buyers for their participation and reminding them to return the survey. We achieved a response rate of 47%.
Which consumers types are more likely to use the Internet? In our survey we asked consumers to rate their agreement or disagreement with a list of statements to get a measure of three consumer traits that we thought, ex ante, could be the unobserved characteristic in our model. These traits are (1) whether a consumer is a car enthusiast, (2) whether a consumer has a high willingness to search, and (3) whether a consumer has a high disutility of bargaining.
To get answers that are reliable and as comparable as possible across respondents, we ask survey participants questions about their behavior or attitudes, not about the traits directly.
For example, we are interested in the "car enthusiast" trait to control for whether a consumer knows a lot about cars, even if they did little or no search for their car purchase. We could have asked a survey participant to agree or disagree with the statement "I am a car enthusiast," thereby leaving it up the respondent to decide what a car enthusiast is. Instead, we get more consistent answers by asking "I read car-and/or truck-enthusiast magazines regularly" and "I tend to visit dealers whenever a new model is introduced." Similarly, we get at consumers' willingness to search with statements such as "I do a lot of price comparison when making large purchases," and "I am the kind of person who gathers as much information as possible before visiting car dealers." Finally, to assess whether a consumer has a high disutility of bargaining, we present consumers with statements such as "I am the kind of person who enjoys negotiating the car's price with the dealer," and "I am afraid that I will be taken advantage of by a dealer 20 when negotiating the price of a new car." We also assess consumers' available time to engage in the bargaining process with the statement "It is hard for me to find time to shop for a new vehicle."
We assess how well the three consumer traits predict Internet usage by including the answers to the statements directly in probit specifications of InternetUse and use of Internet referral services such as Autobytel.com (IRSUse). These specifications also control for demographics on a census block group level. Gender is inferred from an analysis of first names. Table 1 on page 29 presents summary statistics for the survey data. 16 We find support that consumers with a high disutility of bargaining are more likely to go online (see columns 1 and 2 in Table 8 ). Respondents who disagree with "I am the kind of person who enjoys negotiating the car's price with the dealer" are more likely to use the Internet and visit the websites of Internet referral services. In addition, we find that respondents who agree with "I am afraid that I will be taken advantage of by a dealer when negotiating the price of a new car" are more likely to use Internet referral services. We also find that consumers with a lack of time are more likely to use an Internet referral service. Consumers' response to "It is hard for me to find time to shop for a new vehicle" is positively related to IRSUse.
However, it is also the case that consumers with a high willingness to search are also more likely to go online. Consumers who agree with "I am the kind of person who gathers as much information as possible before visiting car dealers," and with "I am the kind of person who tries to find out the dealer's invoice price on a car before going to the dealership to shop" are more likely to use the Internet as well as to use Internet referral services. We find that car enthusiasts are not likely to use the Internet. Thus two of our previously unobserved consumer characteristic fit the first assumption of our selection model in that they are correlated with Internet usage. However, the selection model also assumes that the unobserved characteristic be correlated with transaction price. In in other work we find that only the traits measuring disutility of bargaining affect price, not those indicating that a consumer has a high willingness to search (Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2003b). Based on this evidence we conclude that bargaining disutility is the unobserved characteristic that drives selection in our pricing model -a finding that is consistent with our interpretation of the IV results in the previous section.
These results confirm our conjecture from the IV point estimates, namely that a high personal cost to collecting information and bargaining is an important reason why consumers use the Internet. Consumers who expressed a high disutility of bargaining and lack of time were more likely to go online. In the terminology used to distinguish between the two selection stories, it is the "cowards," not the "cowboys" who are disproportionately likely to use the Internet.
Invoice prices and selling cost
Our findings raise the question of whether the lower prices obtained by dealers for online consumers are offset by lower costs. If this is so, the Internet leads to lower prices without decreasing dealers' unit profits. The first thing to compare is dealer vehicle margins. We have shown that Autobytel.com sales to occur at lower prices. If the invoice prices are lower also, then margins could be preserved. In a levels regression, we find that the vehicle costs of Autobytel.com affiliated dealerships are on average $65 higher per car than at unaffiliated dealerships. In a log regression, costs are higher by 0.29%, or $68 on the average car (see columns 1 and 2 in Table 9 ). Although invoice price appear to be higher for Autobytel.com affiliated dealerships, dealer franchise laws require manufacturers to sell the same car at the same price to all dealers. The higher vehicle cost observed for Autobytel.com affiliated dealerships thus indicates that those dealerships sell cars with more expensive options which are not captured by our car dummies. 17 Since invoice prices are not lower for Autobytel.com dealers, any potential cost savings from selling to Autobytel.com customers must come out of dealers' overhead costs.
Autobytel.com may also reduce the selling costs of dealers by increasing the productivity of a salesperson. Since some of the customer communication is handled by e-mail, a sales person can potentially spend less time for each sale. Regrettably, we cannot test this hypothesis with our transaction data because we do not have information on overhead cost. However, we have no evidence that the lower margins can be fully offset by lower overhead cost. 18
Car and dealer switching
Having shown that Internet referral services lower prices for retail auto sales, in this section we attempt to understand better what aspect of a referral enables consumers to obtain a lower price. We do so by exploiting differences in make, model, and dealer, between the Autobytel.com referral and the actual transaction.
Referral versus transaction dealers
We first analyze whether Autobytel.com usage leads to savings only at the dealer to whom the consumer was referred, or whether the referral is useful for negotiating with other dealers also. Consumers can take the price quote in response to a referral and the information obtained during the process, and try to negotiate a low price from a dealer not affiliated with the referral service.
We add to our basic specification an indicator identifying those Autobytel.com consumers who purchased the car from their referred dealer, SameDealer (see column 1 in Table 10 ).
These consumers are "doing what they are supposed to" from the point of view of the dealer and the Autobytel.com business model. The coefficient on SameDealer is 0.15%, i.e. consumers who continue their (costly) search after having received a referral pay slightly less than do consumers who do not continue searching. While this suggests that the information provided by Autobytel.com is portable, it also suggests that, on average, the benefit to consumers of continuing to search is small.
Referred versus purchased make and model
Next, we analyze whether consumer savings from using Autobytel.com are associated with the mere fact of submitting a referral, or whether it matters that consumers submit a referral for the specific make (nameplate) and model that they purchase. We can analyze this question because 51% of the consumers who use Autobytel.com do not purchase the car for which they made a purchase request. 19 Recall that up until this point in the paper, these buyers were excluded from the dataset.
We define these consumers as ChangeCar buyers rather than SameCar buyers. Of these ChangeCar buyers, 30% end up purchasing a car of the same make (but not model) as the car for which they made a purchase request. We previously noted that 28% of SameCar consumers buy from their referred dealer. For consumers who change make and model, only 6.75% buy from the referred dealer.
To compare a buyer's requested versus purchased model, we calculate the average price of each make and model in the dataset. We then compare the prices of the referred cars versus the purchased cars. We do this for the 79% of buyers who make exactly one referral request. We ignore the remaining observations because otherwise we would have to choose arbitrarily which request to analyze. We find that buyers who change cars, on average, request a price quote for a more expensive car than the one they buy. The median ChangeCar consumer buys a car that costs $500 less and that was on the lot for two more days than the requested car. Consumers seem to be searching for the lowest price on their "dream car" before resigning themselves to buying a less expensive alternative. Interestingly, we find that consumers who change models but not dealers, buy cars that are, on average more expensive than the ones they requested. 20 .
We add a second Autobytel.com variable to our standard price specification. Autobytel * ChangeCar is one if a consumer purchases a different make or model than the one requested through Autobytel.com. Autobytel continues to capture the effect of Autobytel.com
for consumers who buy a make and model they requested. The sample size increases by 19,227
observations because we add consumers who purchased a different make or model from the one requested through Autobytel.com.
We find that the Autobytel * ChangeCar coefficient is about half the size of the Autobytel coefficient, -0.47% versus -0.88% (see column 2 in Table 10 ). We can further distinguish between consumers who change make and model and those who only change model but purchase a car of the requested nameplate. We find that consumer who change make and model receive a -0.38% discount, those who stay with the same make get -0.69% and those who buy the car they asked about receive a -0.88% discount (see column 3 in Table 10 ). Finally, among ChangeCar consumers, there is no difference between the price paid by those who purchase from the referred dealer and those who switch dealership (see column 4 in Table 10 ). 21
The fact that consumers get a bigger price reduction when they have information that is more relevant to the car they actually purchase suggests that consumers' bargaining outcomes are materially improved by the information they obtain on Autobytel.com. If instead Autobytel.com usage were simply a proxy for whether a consumer is a savvy bargainer, the "savvy bargaining" effect on the price would presumably not vary with whether the consumer ended up buying the car for which they originally requested a referral. Our finding that Autobytel.com usage is not a proxy for good bargaining ability is consistent with our IV results and the results of the survey.
Finally, this also provides evidence that the Autobytel.com discount is unlikely to be explained by lower selling costs. If the discount simply reflected lower cost, the effect on the price would presumably not vary with whether the consumer ended up buying the car for which they originally requested a referral.
This paper is concerned with whether the Internet can lower profits for an established offline industry. In particular, this paper has begun where Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso Autobytel.com because they know that they would do poorly in the traditional channel. We confirm this conjecture by analyzing survey data that directly measures consumer traits and
Internet use. We find that consumers who expressed a high disutility of bargaining and lack of time were more likely to go online. In the terminology used to distinguish between the two selection stories, it is the "cowards," not the "cowboys" who are disproportionately likely to use the Internet.
As suggested by our selection results, we find that a dealership's Autobytel.com sales are associated with a reduction in high margin sales. We also find that having a make-and model-specific price quote lowers the price a customer pays by more than obtaining general information from the Internet, or having characteristics associated with Internet usage. This finding is also consistent with our selection result, namely that the mere fact that a consumer has chosen to use the Internet in searching for a new car cannot explain the lower prices paid by Autobytel.com consumers.
Our results imply that the advent of auto Internet referral services benefits Internet consumers by raising their consumer surplus. In 1999, the consumers in our sample saved $10 million in aggregate. If we extrapolate the results here from the 3% of the sample that uses
Autobytel.com and buys the car they requested to the portion of the market not covered by the MRI data, the aggregate savings to Internet consumers would be as much as $240 million per year. We would be surprised if this result represented a steady state in the US auto industry, since the technology was very new at the time our data were collected, and many parties (dealers and consumers) had either not reacted to or did not know about the existence of online referral services. However, our results allow us to conclude that at the time of our data, Autobytel.com and most likely the other referral and informational sites that also existed at the time, were facilitating a substantial redistribution of surplus in the retail auto industry. 0.97 0.98 + All coefficients are multiplied by 100. * significant at 5%; ** sign. at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. † Unreported are car, month, and region fixed effects. Instruments for Autobytel in (4): Number of references in zip code, same divided by zip code population. In (5) number of references in zip code in month prior to purchase, same divided by zip code population. In (6) same as (4) and sum of ad measure two and three weeks before purchase. Instruments for AutobytelFranchise in (4), (5), and (6): Difference in distance between closest dealer and closest Autobytel.com dealer of relevant make, indicator variable when Autobytel.com dealer is closest dealer. † † The number of obs. in (5) is lower because we use lagged number of referrals and do not have data for 1998. The number of obs. in (6) is lower because we use lagged advertising and do not have data for 1998. 
